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Infrastructure industries including telecommunications, electricity, water, and gas 
underwent massive structural changes during the 1990s.  During that decade, hundreds of 
privatization transactions valued at billions of dollars were completed in these sectors in 
developing and transitional economies.  While privatization has received the most attention, 
reforms also included market liberalization, structural changes like unbundling, and the 
introduction of new laws and regulations.  To date, regulations have received far less attention 
than their potential economic effects warrant, largely due to lack of data.  In order to address this 
problem, we set out to compile an extensive, comprehensive, and consistent dataset through an 
extensive survey of telecommunications and electricity regulators in developing countries.  Our 
database of telecommunications regulations includes 178 variables on regulatory governance and 
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Infrastructure industries including telecommunications, electricity, water, and gas 
underwent massive structural changes during the 1990s.  During that decade, hundreds of 
privatization transactions valued at billions of dollars were completed in these sectors in 
developing and transitional economies, or DTEs (Table 1).  While privatization has received the 
most attention in both the popular and academic literature, reforms have involved more than just 
privatization.  They have also included market liberalization, structural changes like unbundling, 
and the introduction of new laws and regulations. 
Until recently, infrastructure sectors were generally considered “natural monopolies,” 
meaning that people believed that a single firm could provide service at the lowest cost.  As a 
result, most countries restricted entry, allowing single firms, which were usually state-owned, to 
provide service in each industry.
1 Even after technological progress made the natural monopoly 
argument less tenable—especially in the telecommunications sector—these firms typically 
retained a dominant, and often monopoly, position in most countries.  Privatization therefore 
meant creating a private firm capable of exercising significant market power.  In other words, 
even when competition was feasible, the presence of a dominant firm often made its introduction 
difficult.  Regulatory agencies and regulations thus became an integral component of reform as a 
means of protecting consumers, reassuring investors, and, presumably, helping to advance 
competition.
2  Nonetheless, in developing countries the design of regulatory policies and 
structures to govern infrastructure industries after privatization was often given relatively little 
                                                           
1  In the telecommunications sector, single enterprises usually provided service over the entire country.  In other 
sectors, such as water, although there were often multiple providers within any country, they usually had a 
monopoly in the region where they provided service 
2  While the phrase “regulation” is quite broad, we focus on regulatory agencies that deal with privatized 
infrastructure; that is, “utilities which require a fixed network to deliver their services” (Newbery 1999).  It is worth 
noting, though, that other types of regulation in developing countries are beginning to receive attention in the 
literature, as well. For example, Djankov, et al (2002) attempt to measure how regulations affect firm entry in 
general.   2
attention compared to privatization itself (see Kessides 2003 for a comprehensive overview of 
regulation in DTEs). 
Several factors may help explain the relatively low weight given to regulation.  First, 
fiscal crises often motivated reforms, making many believe that it was important to privatize 
quickly.
3   While privatization transactions are by no means simple, they are in many respects 
more straightforward than designing regulations and regulatory agencies.  Speed thus meant 
privatizing first and worrying about regulation later.
4  Second, there was concern that regulatory 
agencies would simply become a new mechanism through which the state could interfere with 
the market.
5  Finally, industrialized countries were beginning to realize the costs of regulation 
and were rapidly deregulating industries where there appeared to be little economic reason for it 
(Winston 1993).  In that context it could have seemed somewhat hypocritical to advocate new 
regulatory authorities in transition and developing countries while dismantling them in 
industrialized countries. 
Just as designing and implementing regulation was subordinate to the privatization itself, 
empirical research has also focused far more heavily on privatization than it has on regulation.  
While some case studies have explored regulation in developing countries, most cross-country 
empirical work has involved little more than including a dummy variable indicating the presence 
of a regulator (and perhaps whether the regulator is, in theory, “independent”) in a reduced-form 
regression. 
However, regulations, regulators, regulated industries, and politics interact in 
complicated ways that affect the development of the industry as well as the rest of the economy.  
The importance of these interactions has long been recognized and debated in the United 
States—the country with the most experience dealing with private (monopoly) utilities.  Indeed, 
                                                           
3  Because reform was sometimes motivated in part by the need for revenue, policymakers often tried to maximize 
revenues by granting temporary monopolies to the privatized utilities, rather than trying to maximize some broader 
measure of economic surplus or welfare.  Such an approach seems to have been successful in increasing investors’ 
valuations of companies, but the monopolies tended to invest less than firms that operated in competitive 
environments (Wallsten 2000). 
4  The speed of privatizations was debated almost from the start of the privatization trend, with some arguing for 
speedy privatization (see, for example, Lipton and Sachs 1990), and others arguing for a slower approach with 
greater emphasis on building regulatory institutions (e.g., Newbery 1991, Summers 1994).  While the fast 
privatization argument generally won out, many now believe it should have been done more slowly (see, for 
example, Stiglitz 1999). 
5  This fear is still a real one.  A recent proposal in Russia would have established a single agency to coordinate 
tariffs in energy, railways, transport terminals, atomic energy, water and air transport, gas and communications—a 
proposal that sounds remarkably like centralized planning and optimization (Larina 2001).   3
well before privatization became a worldwide phenomenon an extensive body of literature on 
regulation had developed in the US (see, for example, Baron 1989, Braeutigam 1989, Noll 1989, 
Peltzman 1976, Stigler 1971).   
One reason for the vast body of literature on regulation in industrialized countries is the 
sea of data generated as a byproduct of the interaction of regulatory agencies and regulated firms.  
Likewise, the main reason for the paucity of empirical work on regulation in developing 
countries has been the lack of data, which has prevented researchers from exploring regulation in 
any detail.  Our survey of telecommunications and electricity regulators is an attempt to begin to 
fill this gap by providing systematic data to inform empirical analysis.  The survey yields a large 
dataset that should help promote understanding of regulatory institutions as they actually 
function and how they interact with the industry and economy. 
We are not the first to survey regulators.  NERA (1997) conducted surveys of selected 
infrastructure utility regulators in six countries.
6  The 12 surveys elicited responses that NERA 
then interpreted and graded, providing a kind of “scorecard” of regulators.  While among the first 
of its kind, the information gathered tended to be verbal responses rather than data that could 
easily be compared.  And because the 12 surveys were spread over many industries and few 
countries, the effort generated valuable information, especially for case studies, but not enough 
to be used for cross-country or cross-industry empirical analysis.
7  We designed our surveys 
explicitly to generate data that can inform such empirical work. 
 
2. Survey Design 
 
As discussed above, empirical research on infrastructure reforms in developing countries 
has largely ignored the role of regulation.  Moreover, the few papers that have explored 
regulation have not gone much deeper than controlling for whether a regulatory agency exists, 
and perhaps whether it is considered “independent.”  Our survey effort is an attempt to produce 
data that will allow empirical researchers to explore regulations and regulatory agencies in far 
                                                           
6   NERA’s (1997) survey covered electricity, gas, telecoms, transport, and water in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Philippines.  They did not cover all industries in all countries, so the total number of 
surveys was 12. 
7   Electricity was the best covered, with four regulatory agencies included.  The others each had two.  Three 
regulators were surveyed in India and Malaysia, two in Indonesia and the Philippines, and one each in Bangladesh 
and Pakistan.   4
more depth than has generally been possible to date.  In this section we explain the general 
framework for designing the surveys.  In the following two sections we provide some specific 
details regarding the telecommunications and electricity surveys, respectively. 
For analytical purposes, regulations can usefully be broken down into governance and 
content (Levy and Spiller 1994).  Governance includes the structures that determine whether 
those incentives are credible and sustainable.  In other words, governance includes rules that 
order the scope, configuration, and process of regulatory decision-making and the organization 
and procedures of regulatory agencies (e.g., Levy and Spiller 1996, Williamson 1996).  Content 
includes the specific laws and policies towards pricing, competition, access, and investment that 
shape incentives facing firms and consumers. 
We designed the surveys to capture the large variance in both governance and content.  
Even basic ideas regarding what is considered important for effective regulatory agencies can 
take many forms and be subtly different across regulators.  For example, it has become almost an 
article of faith among advisers to developing countries that in order to be effective a regulator 
must be independent from short-term political pressure.  The small amount of empirical research 
that has investigated the issue typically uses a dummy variable to indicate whether or not a 
regulator is independent.
8  Such an approach may be a reasonable first step for empirical 
research, especially when that dummy variable was the only extant empirical data, but 
characterizing a regulatory agency as either independent or not independent is unrealistic.  No 
government agency is (or probably should be) completely independent, and can be more or less 
independent across a wide range of issues. 
Thus, rather than ask whether a regulator is independent, we instead ask many objective 
questions that can help determine how independent a regulator is in different areas.  So, for 
example, among other questions that might be relevant for independence, the survey asks how 
much of a regulator’s budget comes from industries’ fees, government appropriations, donors, 
and other sources; under what circumstances a regulator can be fired; and whether the country’s 
chief executive (president or prime minister) can veto regulatory decisions.  Moreover, 
                                                           
8 See, for example, Baudrier (2001) or Wallsten (2001, 2002).  Interestingly, none of these papers finds 
unambiguously positive effects of independence on sector performance, and finds some evidence of negative effects.  
These results could be because independence, in fact, is not good for development of the sector, because the 
regulator dummy variable is likely to be endogenous but is not treated that way in the regressions, because a dummy 
variable is an unsatisfactory measure of independence, or because independence is only one of many features of 
governance that work together as a system of checks and balances.  The questions raised by these results highlight   5
governance does not end with independence: accountability, transparency, capacity, and 
competency are also likely to be important features (see, for example, Noll 2000).  The surveys 
contain numerous measures of these criteria, as well.  This approach allows researchers to gain a 
better understanding of the nuanced ways in which regulators may or may not be “independent” 
and how those ways may interact with other governance features (see, for example, Haggarty, 
Shirley, and Wallsten (2003) who use the telecommunications dataset to explore the extent to 
which countries meet these criteria and why they may exist in some countries but not others). 
 
3. Country Selection 
 
  Our intention was to survey all telecommunications and electricity regulators that were 
operating in developing countries in 2001.  We first identified every developing country that 
seemed to have a regulatory agency with an email address or fax number.  We sent the survey 
via email, fax, and regular mail to those agencies, and followed up with telephone calls.  As is 
made clear below, we had more success with telecommunications regulators than with electricity 
regulators.  This difference in response rates largely reflects the more advanced state of reforms 
in telecommunications compared to electricity. 
 
4. The Survey of Telecommunications Regulators 
 
Between March and August, 2001, we contacted 60 regulatory agencies around the 
world.  We ultimately received responses from 45 countries (Table 2).  The result is an extensive 
database containing 178 variables on regulatory governance and content in 45 countries towards 
the end of 2001.  Not all 45 respondents answered all questions, of course, meaning that the 
sample size for any given question is typically less than 45.  Nonetheless, the survey provides 
detailed, consistent, comparable data at a level of detail not available before.  Appendix 1 
contains the survey instrument, coded for use with the dataset. 
The survey asked a variety of questions on many aspects of governance and content.  On 
governance respondents provided information on the precise laws affecting the regulatory 
agency and regulations, as well as several measures of independence, transparency, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the need both for more empirical work on regulation and the data to do that work.   6
accountability, capacity, and competency.  On regulatory content, respondents provided 
information on licenses (wireline, wireless, and internet), interconnection, price regulation, and 
universal service obligations and funding mechanisms.  Finally, the survey collected limited 
information on the state of the sector, including whether and when the incumbent was privatized, 
and the number of mobile, wireline, and Internet Service Provider licenses applied for, awarded, 
and active. 
Consider, for example, regulatory independence.  As discussed above, the survey 
included various questions on different aspects of independence.  One measure of independence 
is how the regulatory agency is funded.  An agency may be less independent if it relies on 
government allocations.  Figure 1 shows how countries tend to finance their regulators.  The data 
show that regulatory agencies tend to receive their budgets either entirely through fees or entirely 
from a government allocation.  Another measure of independence is the direct power the chief 
executive (typically, the president or prime minister) has over the regulator and regulations.  
Figure 2 reveals that in slightly more than half the sample countries the chief executive can fire 
the regulator, while in about 40 percent of the countries the executive can veto the regulators’ 
decisions. 
The survey also contains information on regulatory content.  Countries commonly 
regulate prices, for example.  Figure 3 reveals that nearly all countries regulate prices of fixed-
line service, domestic long distance, and international calls.  About 40 percent still regulate 
prices in mobile telephony. 
These figures provide a glimpse of the sort of information in the dataset.  The myriad 
data should allow researchers to begin to explore how different types of regulatory governance 
and content interact with telecommunications reforms to affect the development of the industry.  
We hope that these data will serve as a first step in exploring empirically the interactions 
between telecommunications regulation and performance in developing countries. 
 
5. The Survey of Electricity Regulators 
 
  Electricity reforms have not proceeded as quickly as have telecommunications reforms.  
It proved more difficult to identify regulatory agencies and to elicit responses from the agencies 
we identified.  Our survey of electricity regulators therefore has fewer observations than does the   7
survey of telecommunications regulators.  In the summer of 2001, we identified and contacted 46 
regulators by email, fax, and regular mail.  We followed up with faxes and telephone calls, and 
by April 2002 received 20 responses (Table 3).  Breaking responses into their individual 
components yields a dataset of 20 observations and 374 variables.  As in the telecommunications 
survey, not all regulators responded to all questions, so not all variables exist for each 
observation.  Appendix 2 provides the complete questionnaire, coded for use with the STATA 
dataset. 
In addition to governance questions of the sort described above, we asked regulatory 
content questions tailored to the electricity sector.  For example, the survey inquires about the 
state of unbundling of transmission, generation, and distribution.  Questions regarding 
competition, too, are specific to the electricity sector, asking, for example, whether choice of 
electricity supplier is restricted to consumers of some minimum size—common in early stages of 
electricity reforms. 
Consider the general structure of the industry.  The survey asks whether the industry 
remains a vertically integrated monopoly, whether there is any wholesale competition, and 
whether supply and retail competition exists.  Figure 4 shows that while only about one-quarter 
of the countries in the sample retain completely vertically-integrated electricity companies, 
competition is not especially advanced: slightly more than half allow wholesale competition, but 




  The telecommunications and electricity regulation databases are the product of an effort 
to generate systematic, rigorous, cross-country data on regulations and regulatory agencies in 
developing countries.  While these data do not approach the quality and quantity of data 
available for regulated industries in industrialized countries, they provide information at a level 
of detail and for a number of countries not available before.  We hope these datasets can 
contribute substantively to the ongoing reforms of network industries and the debate surrounding 
the optimal structure of these industries.   8
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Table 1  
Infrastructure Privatizations in Developing and Transition Economies (1990-1998) 
 
 Proceeds 
(Millions of US$) 
Number of 
Transactions 
Telecommunications 70,579.40  125 
Electricity & Power   43,096.24  221 
Railways 4,000.55  30 
Ports & Airports  2,339.29  54 
Roads 2,121.05  10 
Water & Sewerage  1,084.66  10 
           Source: World Bank File data. 
Table 2 

































































































































































































































































































































   14
APPENDIX 1 












We are researching the impact of the privatization and liberalization process in the telecommunications 
sector of emerging economies around the world, and your country has been included for this study. 
 
We kindly request you to fill the attached questionnaire in order to build a database of various 
telecommunications indicators as part of the study. The questionnaire deals with the following topics:  
 
1.  Overall Sector Performance 
2.  Regulatory Framework 
3.  Market Structure 
4.  Licensing Procedure 
5.  Access and Interconnection Policies 
6.  Price Regulations 
7.  Dispute Resolution and Appeals 
8.  Universal Service Obligations 
 
We would very much appreciate if you could send us the answers to the questionnaire to the above 
address, Mail stop MC 3-300. Since we are working towards a deadline your timely response would be 
really helpful. Thank you in advance for your cooperation on this matter. 





 George  Clarke 
 Economist 
  Development Research Group 
  Competition Policy and Regulation 
 
This appendix consists of a copy of the letter sent to regulators to request their participation, as well as the 
survey itself, coded for use with the STATA dataset. 
 
Code numbers in this appendix are the variable names in the Stata dataset, available here: 
http://www.aei-brookings.org/files/telecomregs.dta 
 
An Excel version of the data is available here: 
 http://www.aei-brookings.org/files/telecom_reg_data.xls 
   15
Please circle the relevant answer(s) when there are multiple choices.   
 
Section 1.  Telecommunications Law. 
1.  Has parliament completely passed framework laws for the telecommunications 
sector?……………q1……………………………….  Yes.  Go to Q. 1.1 
No.  Go to Section 2 
1.1  Please list names, years of publication and numbers for all relevant laws, including general laws related to 





1.2  Does the law explicitly forbid operators from being issued licenses that allow them to provide more than one 
telecommunication service (such as fixed local telephony, domestic long distance, international long distance 
and cellular services)? q12  Yes  Go to Q. 1.4 
No  Go to Q. 1.3. 
1.3  Is separate accounting for services compulsory?………………………    Yes  q13 
No 
1.4  Does the Law allow the telecommunications sector to be privatized in part or in  
whole?…………………………………………………  In Whole    2 
In Part       1        q14 
Not at all     0 
 
 
Section 2.  Regulatory Bodies 
2.  Has a regulatory body (RB) that is separate from the utility and from the communications ministry started 
work?………q2…….…………………     Yes 
No   16
Please list all regulatory bodies involved in regulating the telecommunications sector (including the ministry and/or 
incumbent if they are responsible for some areas of regulation) and the areas of regulation that they are responsible 
for. 
 
Name     Responsibilities    Date of Creation 
Main Regulator.___q2a______     _______q2ar______   ______q2ay____ 
2.________q2b________        _______q2br______   ______________ 
3.________q2c________        _______q2cr______   ______________ 
4.________q2d________        _______q2dr______   ______________ 
5.________q2e________        _______q2er______   ______________ 
2.1    Does the main regulator have national jurisdiction?      Yes 
No  q21 
2.2     Is the main regulator multi-sectoral?        Yes 
No  q22 
2.3     Can the main regulator compel financial and performance information? Yes 
No  q23 
2.4    Are financial and performance information publicly available?   Yes 
No  q24 
2.5     Does the regulator actually collect the following financial data? 
2.5.1  Complete balance sheets from fixed wired operators?    Yes/No  q251 
2.5.2  Complete income statements from fixed wired operators?  Yes/No q252 
2.5.3  Complete balance sheets from cellular operators?    Yes/No  q253 
2.5.4  Complete income statements from cellular operators  ?  Yes/No  q254 
2.5.5  Complete balance sheets from Internet Service Providers?  Yes/No  q255 
2.5.6  Complete income statements from Internet Service Providers?  Yes/No q256   17
2.6     Does the regulator actually collect the following performance indicators? 
2.6.1  Call completion rates by operator?        Yes/No q261 
2.6.2  Faults/Fault Repair Times?        Yes/No  q262 
2.6.3  Geographical coverage rates?        Yes/No q263 
2.7     Approximately what share of the regulator’s budget comes from. 
Government  Budget      ___q27gov______ 
Levies on Companies/License Fees      ___q27fee______ 
Donors       ____q27don_____ 
Other (Please describe) ____________________   ____q27oth_____ 
         1 0 0 %  
2.8     Is the regulatory body headed by a single person or by a group of people (e.g., a regulatory board)? 
       Single person 
Multiple people q28 
2.9      How  many  employees?      ____q29______ 
Of these: 
2.9.1  How  many  technicians?     _____q291_____ 
2.9.2  How  many  engineers?     _____q292_____ 
2.9.3  How  many  accountants?     _____q293_____ 
2.9.4  How  many  economists?     _____q294_____ 
2.9.5  How  many  lawyers?     _____q295_____ 
2.10     Who appoints the head of the regulatory body?        q210 
President     Go  to  2.11 
Ministry     Go  to  2.11 
Parliament     Go  to  2.12 
Other (Specify)___________  Go to 2.12  
2.11  If the president or Ministry appoints the head of the regulator body, is Parliamentary approval required? 
           Yes  q211 
No   18
2.12  Is head appointed for a fixed term?        Yes  Go to 2.12.1  q212 
No  Go to 2.13 
2.12.1  For  how  long?       __________ q2121 
2.12.2  Can head be re-appointed?       Yes q2122 
No 
2.13  Who appoints the majority of the regulatory body’s commissioners?     q213 
President  Go to 2.14 
Ministry  Go to 2.14 
Parliament  Go to 2.15 
Other (Specify)_________________Go to 2.15  
2.14  If the president or Ministry appoints the commissioners, is Parliamentary approval required?       
      Yes q214 
No 
2.15  Are commissioners appointed for fixed terms?    Yes  Go to 2.15.1 q215 
No  Go to 2.16 
2.15.1  For  how  long?      __________ q2151 
2.15.2  Can head be re-appointed?       Yes q2152 
No 
2.16  Can  commissioners  be  fired?      Yes  Go to Q 2.16.1  q216 
No  Go to 2.17 
2.16.1  Can they be fired at the discretion of the executive?   Yes  Go to Q 2.17   q2161 
No  Go to Q 2.16.2. 
2.16.2  Can they be fired for conflict of interest?    Yes q2162 
No 
2.16.3  Can they be fired for incompetence?    Yes  q2163 
No   19
2.16.4  Can they be fired for corruption?      Yes  q2164 
No 




2.18  Can the Minister/President issue written policy guidelines?  Yes   q218 
No 
2.19  Can the Minister/President issue verbal instructions to the regulator?  Yes   q219 
No 
2.20  Has the Minister/President issued any written policy guidelines in past year?  Yes  
No    q220 
2.21  Circle all groups who have the right to participate in regulatory proceedings:   q221 
(a)  Consumers, q221a   (b) Competitors?  q221b  
(c)  Access Users? q221c (d) others (please list)  q221d________________________ 




Section 3.  Restructuring 
2.1  Has the incumbent been commercialized and corporatized?  Yes  q31 
No 
2.2   Is the incumbent responsible for providing postal services    Yes  q32 
No 
2.3  Has the incumbent unbundled  any other components (other than postal services)?       
              Yes  q33 
No   20
2.4   Is there any cross-ownership regulation in place?      Yes  q34 
No 




Section 4. Price Regulation 
5.1  Are final-user prices regulated in the following businesses?  
5.1.1  Fixed-line local telephony?      Yes/No  q411 
5.1.2  Cellular  telephony?     Yes/No  q412 
5.1.3  Domestic  long-distance?     Yes/No  q413 
5.1.4  International long-distance?      Yes/No  q414 
5.1.5  Internet Service providers?      Yes/No  q415 
5.2  Who approves prices for each service. If there is more than one regulator, please list regulator by name. 
   1      0  
5.2.1  Fixed-line local telephony?  Regulator/Ministry/President/Parliament.  q421       Name 
of regulator___________________   Other_____________ 
5.2.2  Cellular telephony?    Regulator/Ministry/President/Parliament.  q422 Name of 
regulator___________________   Other_____________ 
5.2.3  Domestic long-distance?    Regulator/Ministry/President/Parliament.  q423 Name of 
regulator___________________   Other_____________ 
5.2.4  International long-distance?   Regulator/Ministry/President/Parliament.  q424 Name of 
regulator___________________   Other_____________ 
5.2.5  Internet Service providers?   Regulator/Ministry/President/Parliament.  q425  Name of 
regulator___________________   Other_____________ 
5.3   How are prices regulated?   
5.3.1  Fixed-wire local telephony?  Price Cap        q431 
Rate of Return 
Global Price Cap 
None 
Other_______________________________ 
5.3.2  Cellular  telephony?   Price  Cap     q432 
Rate of Return 
Global Price Cap 
None 
Other_______________________________   21
5.3.3  Domestic long-distance?  Price Cap        q433 
Rate of Return 
Global Price Cap 
None 
Other_______________________________ 
5.3.4  International long-distance? Price Cap        q434 
Rate of Return 
Global Price Cap 
None 
Other_______________________________ 
5.3.5  Internet Service providers?   Price Cap        q435 
Rate of Return 




4.4.  Is there a set period of time between regulator reviews?    Yes.    Go to Q.4.5    q44 
No.   Go to Q. 4.6. 
4.5. How long (in terms of years) is the period between reviews for the following services? 
4.5.1  Fixed-line local telephony?      ___________________   q451 
4.5.2  Cellular  telephony?     ___________________      q452 
4.5.3  Domestic long-distance?       ___________________    q453 
4.5.4  international  long-distance?    ___________________      q454  
4.5.5  Internet Service providers?      ___________________   q455 
4.6  Does the government subsidize the following services?  
4.6.1  Service for low income consumers?             Yes/No q461 
4.6.2  Service for rural consumers?    Yes/No  q462 
5.6   What percentage of subsidies comes from the following sources? 
5.6.1  Budget     ______% q471 
5.6.2  Industry  Levies    ______% q472 
5.6.3  Donors     ______%  q473 
5.6.4  Other______________   ______% q474 
100%   22
Section 5.  Interconnection Policies 
6.1  Does the law require that all entrants receive the same technical terms and conditions for 
access/interconnection?     Yes  q51 
No 
6.2  Does the law require that all entrants receive the same prices for access/interconnection?     
        Yes q52 
No 
6.3  How are access fees/interconnection rates set between the following operators? 
5.3.1  Two fixed wired operators       1=  Bilateral Negotiations 
0=          Regulator     q531 
Other, specify: ____________ 
5.3.2  Incumbent local fixed wired-operator and a cellular operator   
Bilateral Negotiations 
Regulator 
Other, specify: ____________ 
5.3.3  Incumbent local fixed wired-operator and long-distance operator       
       Bilateral Negotiations 
Regulator 
Other, specify: ____________ 
5.3.4  Two  cellular  companies      Bilateral Negotiations 
Regulator 
Other, specify: ____________ 
5.3.5  Incumbent local fixed wired and an international operator  Bilateral Negotiations 
Regulator 
Other, specify: ____________ 
6.4 If any prices are set through bilateral negotiations is there a time limit for those operators to 
negotiate an agreement? 
5.4.1  Two  fixed  wired  operators      Yes/No q5411 
5.4.1.1  If yes, how long?      In years    ___________ 
5.4.2  Incumbent local fixed wired-operator and a cellular operator  Yes/No q5421 
5.4.2.1  If  yes,  how  long?       ___________ 
5.4.3  Incumbent local fixed wired-operator and long-distance operator  Yes/No q5431 
5.4.3.1  If  yes,  how  long?       ___________ 
5.4.4  Two  cellular  companies       Yes/No q5441 
5.4.4.1  If  yes,  how  long?       ___________ 
5.4.5  Incumbent local fixed wired and an international operator    Yes/No q5451   23
5.4.5.1  If  yes,  how  long?       ___________ 
6.5  If the two operators can not agree interconnection/access terms, who intervenes to solve conflicts (if no one can 




Section 6: Licences 
7.1  Who decides how many licenses will be issued?    Regulator (Name___________) 
Ministry 
President     q 6 1  
Legislature 
Privatization Commission  
Other______________________ 
7.2  Is there a formal procedure for granting licenses for the following areas?  
7.2.1  Fixed-line local telephony?      Yes/No q621 
7.2.2  Cellular  telephony?     Yes/No  q622 
7.2.3  Domestic  long-distance?     Yes/No  q623 
7.2.4  International long-distance?      Yes/No  q624 
7.2.5  Internet Service providers?      Yes/No  q625 
7.3   If yes (for each area in q 6.2), is this procedure consistently followed? 
7.3.1  Fixed-line local telephony?      Yes/No/No Experience  q631 
7.3.2  Cellular  telephony?     Yes/No/No Experience  q632 
7.3.3  Domestic  long-distance?     Yes/No/No Experience  q633 
7.3.4  International long-distance?      Yes/No/No Experience  q634 
7.3.5  Internet Service providers?      Yes/No/No Experience  q635 
7.4   Who grant licenses for each area? 
7.4.1  Fixed-line local telephony?    1=  Regulator (Name___________) 




7.4.2  Cellular telephony?      1=  Regulator (Name___________) 
0=  Ministry 
President  
Legislature 
Privatization Commission   24
7.4.3  Domestic long-distance?      Regulator (Name___________) 




7.4.4  International long-distance?      Regulator (Name___________) 




7.4.5  Internet Service providers?      Regulator (Name___________) 




7.5   For granting a license is there a mandatory bidding? 
7.5.1  Fixed-line local telephony?      Yes/No/No Experience  q651 
7.5.2  Cellular  telephony?     Yes/No/No Experience q652 
7.5.3  Domestic  long-distance?     Yes/No/No Experience q653 
7.5.4  International long-distance?      Yes/No/No Experience  q654 
7.5.5  Internet Service providers?      Yes/No/No Experience q655 
7.6   Total number licenses in the following areas? 
Area     Approved Number   Awarded Licences  Active Operators 
F   Fixed-line Local    _q66Fapp__   _q66Fawd__   _q66Fact__ 
L   Domestic Long Distance  _q66Lapp__   _q66Lawd__   _ q66Lact__ 
I   International     _q66Iapp__   _q66Iawd__   _ q66Iact__ 
C   Cellular    _ q66Capp__   _ q66Cawd__   _ q66Cact__ 
ISP Internet Service Providers_ q66ISPapp_ _ q66ISPawd   _ q66ISPact_ 
7.7  What approval do private network operators have to get to before they can start operating?      
         None   q67    
           Notification 
Formal Approval 
7.8  What approval do Internet Service Providers have to get before they can start operating?      
         None   q68 
Notification 
Formal Approval   25
7.9  What approval do equipment providers have to get before they can start operating?        
         None   q69 
Notification 
Formal Approval 




Section 7: Spectrum Use 
7.1  Who  assigns  spectrum?      Regulator (Name___________) 
Ministry   q 7 1  
President  
Legislature 
7.2  How is spectrum assigned?        Competitive Bidding 






Section 8: Regulatory Decisions 
8  Can the operator appeal if disagrees with regulators decision?          Yes  Go to 8.1  q8 
No.  Go to 8.3 
8.1  Who can the operator appeal to in each instance? (i.e., Ministry, Executive, Other executive body, Judiciary, 
Formal domestic arbitrator, Formal international arbitrator, no appeal) 
8.1.1  First  Instance      ______________ q811 
8.1.2  Second  Instance      ______________ q812 
8.1.3  Third  Instance      ______________ q813 
8.2  Can the operator appeal under the following circumstances 
8.2.1  On  a  statutory  basis?      Yes/No q821 
8.2.2  On an evidential basis?          Yes/No q822 
8.2.3  On  a  procedural  basis?      Yes/No q823 
8.3  Can  other  parties  appeal?       Yes  Go to 8.4 q83 
No.  Go 8.6 
8.4  Circle all other parties that can appeal 
(a)   Access Users    (b)   Competitors      q 8 4  
(c)   Consumers    (d)   Others  _______________________   26
8.5  Can other parties appeal under the following circumstances 
8.5.1  On  a  statutory  basis?      Yes/No q851 
8.5.2  On an evidential basis?          Yes/No q852 
8.5.3  On  a  procedural  basis?      Yes/No q853 
8.6   Are regulatory meetings open to the public in practice?    All 
Some  q86 
None 
8.7  Are regulatory meetings required to be open to the public by law?  Yes/No q87 
8.8  Are regulatory decisions publicly available?      Yes/No q88 
8.9  Does regulator publish decisions in practice?      Yes/No q89 
8.9.1  If so, where?   _________________q891____________________ 
8.10  Does the law REQUIRE the regulator to public decisions  Yes/No  q810 
8.10.1  If so, where?   _________________q8101____________________ 
8.11  Does regulator publish explanations of decisions in practice?  Yes/No   q8_11 
8.11.1  If so, where?   _________________q8111____________________ 
8.12  Does the law REQUIRE the regulator to publish explanations of decisions  Yes/No q8_12 




Section 9: Geographically Based Obligations 
9  Does any operator have geography-based obligations?      Yes  Go to Q 9.1   q9 
No  Go to End 
9.1  Do any of the obliged operators have funding from special geographically-based obligations fund?    
         Yes/No   q91 
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APPENDIX 2 




As part of our ongoing World Bank Policy Research Report on Infrastructure Regulation, we are 
conducting a survey of international experience with electricity sector reform. We would like to include 
your country in this study.    
 
We kindly request you to take a few moments to fill in the attached questionnaire. Our survey covers the 
following topics:  
 
9.  Electricity Sector Characteristics 
10. Sector Restructuring  
11. Regulatory Framework 
12. Regulatory Process/Decisions 
13. Pricing Issues  
14. Access Policies 
15. Universal Service Obligations/Quality of Supply 
 
Your participation in this survey will enhance the quality of the Report. This study will provide policy 
makers and electricity regulators with insight into effective approaches to regulation and reform based on 
the experience of a broad panel of countries. We would very much appreciate if you could send us your 
timely response by email or fax to:  
Mr. Tooraj Jamasb           or    Mr. Takis Papapanagiotou 
Tel: (202) 473 0451     Tel: (202) 473 5597 
Fax: (202) 522 1155        Fax: (202) 522 1155 
Email:  tjamasb@worldbank.org  Email:  tpapapanagiotou@worldbank.org 
 
or alternatively mail to:   
  
Competition Policy and Regulation Team 
Development Research Group 
Mail Stop MC 3-300, 
The World Bank 
1818 H Street NW 
Washington Dc. 20433, USA 
We would welcome any additional material that you may find useful for the purpose of this study. If you 
have any questions please feel free to contact us. 
 
This appendix consists of a copy of the letter sent to regulators to request their participation, as well as the 
survey itself, coded for use with the STATA dataset. 
 
Code numbers in this appendix are the variable names in the Stata dataset, available here: 
http://www.aei-brookings.org/files/electricregs.dta 
 
An Excel version of the data is available here: 
http://www.aei-brookings.org/files/electricity_reg_data.xls   28
Questionnaire for Electricity Regulators 
 
Please circle or place a cross in front of the relevant answer(s) when there are multiple choices. 
 
Section 1.  Electricity Law 
Has the parliament passed any framework laws aiming at reforming the electricity sector? 
……………Q11…………………….     Yes  Go to 1.2 
  Q11y   (year)   No  Go to Section 2 
2.23  Please list names, years of publication and numbers for relevant laws, including laws related to privatization 
or investment that affect the electricity sector. 





When did the electricity sector reform actually start? (please enter year) _Q13__ 
Does the law explicitly forbid operators from joint ownership of electricity services     (such as generation, 
transmission, distribution, and retail/supply)?………...  Yes/No  Q14 
Does the law allow the entry of new private power companies?………….  Yes/No   Q15 
Does the law allow the electricity sector to be privatized in part or in  whole?…………………………   
          2  =   In Whole Q16 
   1  =    In Part 
          0  = Not at all   29
Section 2.  Restructuring 
Which of the following market models describes the power sector in your country?   
 ……………………………………….      Q21a       Vertically integrated monopoly  0/1 
Q21b       Single buyer market   0/1 
Q21c       Wholesale competition   0/1 
Q21d      Supply/Retail competition          0/1 
Q21e    =  Note           
2.6  Please indicate the years the following reform measures were first initiated in your country: 
Reform measures  Year 
Regulator established  Q22a 
Privatization  Q22b 
Vertical separation  Q22c 
Entry of new private power producers  Q22d 
Wholesale power market (pool, contract, spot, etc.)  Q22e 
2.7  Degree of vertical integration from generation to supply        2 = Unbundled 
Q23       0=    Integrated 
1=  Mixed 
2.8  Has transmission been separated from generation?     2 =  Separate companies 
Q24    1  =    Accounting separation 
 
0 =  Integrated  
Are there vertical restrictions on joint ownership of generation and transmission facilities? 
     Q25         1  =  Yes 
2 =  No 
2.9  Are there horizontal restrictions on the maximum market share of generation and retail supply 
companies?……………………….      1  =  Yes 
Q26     0   =     No   30
2.10  Are there any constraints in the number of operators in Generation?   Yes 
Q27       No 
2.11  Please fill in the following sector information: 
t0         At the time of Reform     
Year: Q28t0y                           
(In case of no reform please enter 
information    5 years ago) 
Post-Reform 
Year: Q28y                             
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Q28t0NG = total number of generators at time of reform 
Q28t0NT = total number of transmission companies at time of reform 
Q28t0ND = total number of distribution companies generators at time of reform 
Q28t0NS = total number of supply companies at time of reform 
 
2.12  Have the public (e.g. central government, state-owned, municipal etc.) company(ies) been corporatized?  
          Yes 
Q29     No 
2.13  Are consumers allowed to choose among electricity suppliers?           
      Q210     Yes 
No   31
2.14     Is there a customer size threshold (e.g. KW/KWh) for free consumer choice?    Yes 
Q211       No 
 
2.15    Please provide the customer threshold(s) (in kW/kWh) for which consumers are free to choose among electricity 
producers/suppliers and the date this regulation(s) took (will take)   effect:     Q212 
Customer Type    Customer Size       % of Total Consumption   Date 
         ( k W / k W h )  
          (a)                      (b)                     (c) 
Industrial   Q212aI    Q212bI        Q212cI 
Commercial     Q212aC        Q212bC        Q212cC   
Residential   Q212aR         Q212bR        Q212cR   32
Section 3.  Regulatory Bodies 
3.1  Has a regulatory body that is separate from the utilities and from the Ministry started to 
work?…………….………………  Q31     Yes/No 
Please list all regulatory bodies involved in regulating/overseeing the electricity sector (including the ministry and/or 
incumbent if they are responsible for some areas of regulation) and the areas of regulation that they are responsible for. 
Name  a     Responsibilities  b    Date of Creation  c 
1. Main Regulator  Q31a1       Q31b1     Q31c1 
2.      Q31a2            Q31b2     Q31c2 
3.      Q31a3               Q31b3     Q31c3 
4.      Q31a4      Q31b4     Q31c4 
3.2  Does your agency oversee multiple sectors?………………    Yes  Q32 
No 
3.2.1  If  yes, which sectors?……………..        _Q321 
3.3  How is the regulatory body financed? (% of regulator’s budget) 
Government  Budget      Q33a 
Levies on Companies/License Fees      Q33b 
Customer levies           Q33c 
Other (Please describe) ____________________   Q33e 
 





3.4  Is the regulatory body headed by a single person or by a group of people (e.g., a regulatory board)?   
        Single person 
Multiple people    Q34   33
 
3.5  How many employees does your agency occupy?    Q35 
Of these: 
3.5.1  How many technicians?      Q351 
3.5.2  How many engineers?      Q352 
3.5.3  How many accountants?      Q353 
3.5.4  How many economists?      Q354 
3.5.5  How many lawyers?      Q355 
3.6   Who appoints the head and/or the commissioners of the regulatory body?   




3.7  If the president or Ministry appoints the head and/or the commissioners of the regulator body, is Parliamentary 
approval required?………………    Yes      1 
No        0  Q37 
3.8  Is head appointed for a fixed term?    Yes 
No   Q38 
3.8.1  For  how  long?      Q381 




   34
3.8.3  Who has the authority to fire head/commissioners? (please mark all that apply)   Q383 
(b)  President   Q38a   (b)  Minister  Q38b 
(d)  Parliament   Q38c    (d) Others (please list)   Q38d 
3.8.4  For what reasons (e.g. incompetence, corruption, conflict of interest)? Please list:                   
Conflict of Interest ----------------------------------------------------------------    Q384a       
Incompetence---------------------------------------------------------------------         Q384b         
Corruption---------------------------------------------------------------------------   Q384c 
3.8.5  How many heads have been removed since your agency’s creation?   Q385 
3.9  Who can veto the regulator’s decisions?   Q39a   President 
Q39b   Minister  
Q39c   Court 
Q39d   Other  
3.10  Who can issue policy guidelines for the regulator?  Q310a =    President 
Q310b =   Minister 
       Q310c =  Parliament 
       Q310d =  Regulator 
       Q310e =  Other  
3.11  Are the policy guidelines publicly available?    Q311   Yes 
No 
3.12  Can the Minister/President give verbal instructions to the regulator?  Yes 
Q312   No 
3.13  Have regional regulatory bodies been created?        Yes 
Q313   No   35
Section 4: Regulatory Process/Decisions 
4.1  Can your agency compel financial and performance information from utilities? 
Q41     Yes 
No 
4.1.1  Is there a standardized reporting format for financial/performance information? 
       Q411     Yes 
No 
4.1.2  Is the financial/performance information audited by: 
Q412a   (a) Regulator     Q412b  (b) Independent auditors    
  Q412c   (c) Others (please list)  _______________________________ 
4.2  Does the regulator make financial and performance information publicly available?       
       Q42     Yes 
No 
4.3  Is there a consultation process prior to regulatory decisions?        Q43   Yes/No 
4.3.1  If so, what type? 
(a)  Consultation papers   Q431a   (b)  Hearings  Q431b 
(c) Meetings  Q431c     (d) Other (please list)____________  
      (No other) 
4.4  Please circle all groups who have the right to participate in regulatory proceedings: Q44 (Study) 
(a)  Consumer groups   Q44a    (b)  Utilities  Q44b 
(c)  Industry associations  Q44c    (d)  Others  (please  list)_____  Q44d   36
4.5  Can the utilities appeal if they disagree with regulator’s decisions?            Yes 
Q45     No 
4.6  Who can the utilities appeal to in each instance? (i.e., Ministry, Executive, Other executive body, Judiciary, 
Formal domestic arbitrator, Formal international arbitrator, no appeal) 
4.6.1  First instance      Q46a: At what stage appeal to regulator 
4.6.2  Second instance      Q46b : At what stage appeal to ministry 
4.6.3  Third instance      Q46c: At what stage appeal to court 
4.7  Can other parties appeal?    Q47     Yes 
No 
4.8  Circle all other parties that can appeal: 
Q48a   (a)   Consumer groups      Q48b    (b)   Utilities 
Q48c    (c)   Industry associations      Q48d       (d)   Others  __________________ 
4.9  Are regulatory meetings open to the public in practice?  Q49   2  /  1  /  0 
4.10  Are regulatory meetings required to be open to the public by law? Q410  Yes/No 
4.11  Are regulatory decisions publicly available?    Q411   Yes/No 
4.12  Does the law REQUIRE the regulator to publish decisions Q412   Yes/No 
4.13  If so, where?       Q413 
4.14  Does the regulator publish decisions in practice? Q414     Yes/No 
4.14.1  If so, where?   Q4141   37
4.15  Does the law REQUIRE the regulator to publish explanations of decisions  Yes/No Q415 
4.15.1  If so, where?   Q4151 
4.16  Does the regulator publish explanations of decisions in practice?    Yes/No Q416 
4.16.1  If so, where?   Q4161 
Section 5. Price Regulation 
5.4  Are the following end-user prices regulated?  
5.4.1  Electricity prices for industry?    Yes/No  Q511 
5.4.2  Commercial electricity prices?    Yes/No  Q512 
5.4.3  Electricity prices for households?    Yes/No  Q513 
5.5  Please provide the following information about end-user price regulation (Please mark all that apply).   Q52 
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5.6  Type of existing power market (Please mark all that apply):       
Q53a  (a)  Bilateral contracts  Q53b  (b)  Spot market   Q53c  (c)  Pool       
Q53d  (d)  Forward market  Q53e   (e)  Balancing market     Other_______ 
5.6.1  Is participation in the wholesale markets mandatory? Yes/No  Q531   38
5.6.2  If so, in what type of market?   Q532                      ___________________ 
5.7  What is the price control method for:   
5.7.1  Transmission?……………..     RC Revenue  Cap 
Q541     PC  Price Cap  
  RR  Rate of Return 
None  None 
Other  Other__________________ 
5.7.2  Distribution?……………….     RC Revenue  Cap 
Q542     PC  Price Cap 
RR  Rate of Return 
None  None 
Other  Other__________________ 
5.5  How long (in terms of years) is the period between price reviews?  Q55 ………. 
5.7  Does the government subsidize the use of specific generation fuels?  Yes/No   Q56 
5.7.1  If so, which?    Q561     
(a)    Natural  Gas     (b)    Coal 
(c)    Oil      (d)    Renewables_______________ 
(e) Other_________________ 
5.8  Are prices for any consumer groups subsidized?  Q57     Yes/No 
5.8.1  If so, which prices? 
Q571a  (a)   Residential     Q571b (b)    Commercial   
Q571c  (c)   Industrial     Q571d (d)    Other_____________ 
5.8.2  What percentage of subsidies comes from the following sources?  Q572  (String) 
5.8.2.1  Government  Budget      ______% 
5.8.2.2  Industry  Levies       ______%   39
5.8.2.3  Other  (specify)__________________    ______% 
5.8.2.4  Internal X Subs 
100% 
5.9  Please fill in the following information: 
 
Average End-User Electricity Prices (In Local Currency Unit) 
T0             At the time of Reform 
Year:  Q58t0y                              
(In case of no reform please enter information 5 
years ago) 
Post-Reform 
Year:  Q58y                      
(In case of no reform please enter 
most recent information) 
  R  Residential  I   Industrial  R   Residential  I   Industrial 
Generation  Q58t0RG Q58t0IG  Q58RG  Q58IG 
Transmission  Q58t0RT Q58t0IT  Q58RT  Q58IT 
Distribution  Q58t0RD Q58t0ID  Q58RD  Q58ID 
Supply  Q58t0RS Q58t0IS  Q58RS  Q58IS 
Total  Q58t0R Q58t0I  Q58R  Q58I 
 
Section 6.  Access/Interconnection Policies 
6.6  Does the law require non-discriminatory access to transmission and distribution networks (Third Party Access 
TPA)?…………………..   Q61      Yes/No  
6.7  Does the law require that all entrants receive the same technical terms and conditions for 
access?………………………………..   Q62   Yes/No 
 
6.8  Does the law require that all entrants receive the same prices for access?   Yes/No  Q63  
6.9  How are access fees/interconnection rates set between the generation and transmission/distribution operators?
  Q64        Negotiated TPA 
Regulated TPA 
Other (specify): ____________ 
6.10  If operators cannot agree on access/interconnection terms/fees, who can intervene to resolve 
conflicts?.…………………………………                 Q65    40
6.11  Is transmission access controlled by an independent system operator (ISO)? Q66   Yes/No 
6.12  Is the transmission network operator required to extend the network to meet 
demand?…………………………………………………….  Q67                 Yes/No 
Section 7: Licenses 
 
7.11  Is there a formal procedure for granting/renewing licenses for the following areas?  
7.11.1  Generation?   Q711     Yes/No 
7.11.2  Transmission?   Q712     Yes/No 
7.11.3  Distribution?   Q713     Yes/No 
7.11.4  Retail Supply?    Q714     Yes/No 
7.11.5  Imports?     Q715     Yes/No 
7.11.6  Exports?     Q716     Yes/No 
7.12  Who approves licenses? 
   Regulator President  Ministry  Parliament  Other (please 
specify) 
Q72g  Generation         
Q72T  Transmission         
Q72D  Distribution         
Q72S  Retail Supply         
Q72M  Imports         
Q72X  Exports         
7.13  Is there a mandatory bidding for granting licenses? 
7.13.1  Generation?   Q731     Yes/No/No Experience 
7.13.2  Transmission?   Q732     Yes/No/No Experience 
7.13.3  Distribution?   Q733     Yes/No/No Experience 
7.13.4  Retail Supply?    Q734     Yes/No/No Experience 
7.13.5  Imports?     Q735     Yes/No/No Experience 
7.13.6  Exports?     Q736     Yes/No/No Experience   41
7.14  Can a license be revoked?     Q74     Yes/No 
7.14.1  If yes for what reason?   Q741     ______________   
Section 8: Universal Service Obligations/Quality of Supply  
8.1  Are utilities allowed to cut-off service for non-payment?   Q81  Yes/No 
8.2  Is there a clearly stated policy addressing issues such as: 
Q82a  (a)  Non-Payment/Credit problems  Q82b       (b)   Cost of new connections  
Q82c  (c)   Support of low-income groups  Q82d  (d)  Supply of rural customers 
Q82e  (e)   Non-discrimination among consumers       Other_________________ 
8.2  What are the bodies involved in protection consumer interests? (please mark all that apply) 
Q821a  (a)   Independent interest/consumer groups  Q821b  (b)   Regulator 
Q821c  (c) Other government agencies        Others_________________ 
8.3  Are there well-defined targets or minimum standards for quality of service (e.g. number of interruptions, 
minutes lost per customer, SAIFI, SAIDI, etc)?………Q83   Yes/No   42
8.3.1  If so, are there well-defined penalty schemes for non-compliance?  Yes/No Q831 
8.3.2  Have there been any quality of service improvements after reform? Yes/No Q832 
8.3.2.1  If yes, please describe improvements: ___Q8321____________________ 
8.6  Number of connections/customers:  Q86____________________________ 
8.6  Please enter the following information: 
Degree of Electrification (e.g. % of population, % of households) 
At the time of Reform 
 (In case of no reform please enter information 5 years 
ago) 
Post-Reform 
 (In case of no reform please enter most recent 
information) 
% (specify indicator)  Year  % (specify indicator)  Year 
Q86t0 Q86t0y  Q86 Q86y 
Section 9: Sector Characteristics 
9.1  Please fill in the following sector information: 




t0      At the time of Reform  
Year:Q91t0y                            
(In case of no reform please enter information 
5 years ago) 
Post-Reform  
Year:  Q91y                             
(In case of no reform please enter most recent 
information) 
Generation Type  Installed Capacity in MW  Installed Capacity in MW 
O    Oil  Q91t0O Q91O 
C    Coal  Q91t0C Q91C 
G    Natural Gas  Q91t0G Q91G 
H    Hydro  Q91t0H Q91H 
N    Nuclear  Q91t0N Q91N 









   43
 
 
9.2 System  Losses:   
Transmission/Distribution Losses 
At the time of Reform 
 (In case of no reform please 
enter information 5 years ago) 
Post-Reform                 
(In case of no reform enter 
current information) 
(MWh) Year  (MWh) Year 
 Q92t0  Q92t0y  Q92  Q92y 
    
+ Shr = Percentage 
  Q92t0t  =  trans losses    Q92t0Tshr = pct losses trans 
  Q92t0d =  dist. losses    Q92t0dshr = pct losses dist 
 
 
9.3  Please fill in the following tables: 
E       Number of full-time sector employees  M                           MWh                                                       
(Generated, transmitted, distributed, sold) 
  
 
Q93  At the time of Reform 
Year:  Q93Et0y         
(In case of no reform 
please enter information 
5 years ago) 
Post-Reform 
Year:  Q93Ety          
(In case of no reform 
please enter most recent 
information) 
At the time of Reform 
Year: Q93Møy          
(In case of no reform 
please enter information 
5 years ago) 
Post-Reform 
Year: Q93My               
(In case of no reform please 
enter most recent 
information) 
G  Generation  Q93Et0G  Q93EG  Q93Mt0yG                     Q93MG 
T  Transmission  Q93Et0T Q93ET  Q93Mt0yT  Q93MT 
D  Distribution  Q93Et0D Q93ED  Q93Mt0yD  Q93MD 
S  Supply  Q93Et0S Q93ES  Q93Mt0yS  Q93MS 





  G                          Generation  R                         Retail Supply   
Companies  M 
Market Share (%) 
O    Ownership Status                
(State-owned, minority private, 
majority private, private) 
M 
Market Share (%) 
O      Ownership Status                
(State-owned, minority private, 
majority private, private) 
1  Largest   Q931GM1 Q931GO1  Q931RM1  Q931RO1 
2  Second Largest  Q931GM2 Q931GO2  Q931RM2  Q931RO2 
























THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR HELP 
 